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TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE: ANOTHER O-RING IN
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
THIRD WORLD
James R. Germano, Esq.‡

INTRODUCTION
In his breakthrough 1993 article,1 Michael Kremer developed, what he
termed, the O-Ring Theory of Economic Development. His theory is based on
the Shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986,2 and postulates that a relatively small
aspect of economic development (in Kremer’s view, the production function
and proper pairing of workers of similar skill), if not planned and executed
correctly, can be disastrous to the sustainability of a developing economy.3 In
1986, the Shuttle Challenger had over two million moving parts,4 and countless non-moving parts; yet a single rubber seal changed the landscape of
NASA and space flight forever.5 This Comment asserts that another possible
“O-Ring” in economic development is a stable telecommunications infrastructure. Investing in and budgeting for telecommunications should be a legislative and economic priority of third world governments to ensure that they stay
competitive in the global market. Standard Ricardian theory6 retards the
‡

Attorney, Williams Mullen. I would like to thank Professor Antonio Perez at the Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law, for his guidance and assistance in writing
this Comment.
1
Michael Kremer, The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development, 108 Q. J. OF ECON.
551, 551 (1993).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Jacqui Goddard, Nice Runner, 278 Million Miles, One Owner, Just Eur27m; United
States, THE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5366074.ece.
5
Jeff Forrest, The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster: A Failure in Decision Support
System and Human Factors Management, DSSRESOURCES.COM (Oct. 7, 2005),
http://dssresources.com/cases/spaceshuttlechallenger/index.html.
6
See infra Part I.
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growth of third world countries by incentivizing international organizations
and developed countries to under-invest in their telecommunications infrastructure.7 With the proliferation of mobile devices in both first and third world
countries, a reliable telecommunications infrastructure is a necessary staple for
equalizing economic growth.8 There is a problem, however, in ordinary costbased and pro-competitive governmental regimes: they will only exacerbate
the advantage of first world countries and deepen the third world dependence
on the developed world.9 Spillover effects and technological pairing will tend
to only worsen these problems.10
Part I of this Comment will fully explain the O-Ring Theory of Economic
Development and how it can be applied in international telecommunications.
Part I will also specifically focus on the Reference paper,11 which is an outline
of the goals for international telecommunications as proffered by the World
Trade Organization (WTO), and how it might be used both to hinder and assist
developing countries in their economic expansion. Part II of this Comment
will discuss the possible counterarguments to the O-Ring theory, and, specifically, its application to international telecommunications development. Specifically, Part II will discuss leapfrogging and technology transfer programs that
demonstrate specific anti-O-Ring effects. Lastly, Part III of this Comment will
discuss the actual and potential O-Ring effects and adherence to conflicting
international economic policies through a case study of the country of Cameroon.
PART I - THE O-RING AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT
Kremer asserts that because firms are indifferent as to the skill level of their
workers (as long as they are uniform), better workers will drift to better firms
(which are usually located in developed12 economies), allowing those firms and

See infra Part I.
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Parts II and III.
10 See infra Part I.
11 Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper, Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, WTO (Apr. 24, 1996),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm [hereinafter Telecommunications].
12 The terms “developed” and “developing” countries are used throughout this paper as
synonyms with first world and third world, respectively. In fact, Black’s Law Dictionary
defines third world country by directing the reader to Developing Country. Developing
Country, BLACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
7
8
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those economies to increase their lead.13 This effect is known as demonstrating
positive spillover.14 His economic principles are based on a production function
solving for output, which includes worker quantity and skill level.15 This production function is explained in more detail in appendix A.16
Once Kremer’s hypothesis is proven, it is easy to see how, in the short term,
workers and firms will happily accommodate the system. First world economies can afford to import better skilled workers and train their own workers to
be more efficient.17 This ability, in turn, creates high quality product.18 Third
world countries are unable to keep pace in this regard, so their product quality
is lower and thus actually more expensive for their home country consumers.19
In the short term, this outcome is acceptable (and efficient)20 because developing countries will happily produce output and provide a service to their citizens, even if the price is somewhat high.21 There is a market for lower-quality
goods within any sub-economy, so third world countries are satisfied in the
short term.22 Over the long term, however, considering the disparities between
the returns to scale on labor23 (and telecommunications), third world countries
will never be able to catch up; the first step they make toward becoming competitive eventually becomes the limiting factor in their ability to compete globally.24 The factors that have the greatest impact on their ability to catch up in
the long term are the combination of several spillover effects and strategic
complementarities.25 For example, spillover effects in telecommunications infrastructure could include, among virtually infinite others, transactional
Kremer, supra note 1, at 556.
Id. at 570.
15 Id. at 553-54.
16 Id. at 554.
17 See generally UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, OVERCOMING BARRIERS: HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, v, 84 (2009),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf [hereinafter
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (mapping human migration in an effort to “broaden and
rebalance perceptions of migration to reflect a more complex and highly variable reality.”);
Parija Kavilanz, American manufacturers importing workers, CNN MONEY (Mar. 5, 2012,
11:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/05/smallbusiness/manufacturing-workers/.
18 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 17. See also Douglas A. Irwin, A
Brief History of International Trade Policy, ECONLIB.ORG (Nov. 26, 2001),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Irwintrade.html (arguing that economies throughout history have recognized the importance of exporting manufactured goods).
19 Simon Romero & Sara Shahriari, A Foods Global Success Creates Quandary at
Home: Quinoa Is Now Too Expensive for Many Bolivians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20 2011, at A6.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Kremer, supra note 1, at 573.
24 Nita Rudra, Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed
Countries, 56 INT’L ORG. 411, 417-18 (2002).
25 Kremer, supra note 1, at 570.
13
14
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speed.26
Firms can conduct business more efficiently in developed countries because
their information is faster and more reliable.27 This will lead to further spillover
incentives that include, among others, placing more employees in the developed country and raising the incomes of those employees who wish to relocate
to faster networks. This simple maneuver will have numerous obvious and
non-obvious spillover effects in both the short and long terms.
To explain, assume a relatively small, developed country and a relatively
large company. If more executives relocate to a newly established global headquarters in this developed country and replace mid-level employees, then the
area surrounding that firm (assumed to be a substantial portion of the country)
will flourish. Employees will demand larger and more expensive homes, restaurants will open or expand, and perhaps an airport is required to shuttle the
executives to different locations. These are all spillover effects from a fast and
reliable telecommunications infrastructure. This is what happened when the
United States, for example, invested in a faster and larger network and Cameroon could not.28 The developing country will not be able to catch up. In an
attempt to combat the natural market forces that have led to this unfortunate
situation, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) released the Reference Paper29 to guide development in an egalitarian manner. The international economic forces at work that triggered that Reference Paper can be analogized to monopoly problems.30
The ITU Reference Paper
The WTO investigated the issue set forth herein in 1996 and created one of
the foundational models for international telecommunications development:
the Reference Paper.31 The Reference Paper is a brief but influential work that
was created to serve as a reference for international telecommunications law
and development.32 It was “the first international document that embodies concepts and elements of telecommunications policy and regulations.”33 It pro26 See, e.g., ICT, THE WORLD IN 2010: THE RISE OF 3G 7 (2010) http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/material/FactsFigures2010.pdf.
27 Gordon Hanson, The Globalization of Production, NBER (2001)
http://www.nber.org/reporter/spring01/hanson.html.
28 See infra Part III.
29 Telecommunications, supra note 11.
30 See infra Part I.
31 Telecommunications, supra note 11.
32 Boutheina Guermazi, Exploring the Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles 1
(2002) (unpublished comment) (on file with WTO).
33 Id.
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vides “definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic
telecommunications services.”34 In addition to advancing relevant definitions,
the Reference Paper has six focal points: competitive safeguards, interconnection, universal service, public availability of licensing criteria, independent
regulators, and allocation of scarce resources.35 These six headings outline the
goals of the WTO in assisting and regulating international telecommunications
development. According to leading scholars:
The objective of the reference paper is twofold. First, it aims to provide foreign service providers with regulatory safeguards to guarantee that monopolies
or former monopolies do not abuse their market power to undermine competition. Second, it aims to provide a harmonized set of regulations in order to
minimize the phenomenon of asymmetric regulation.36
Similar to this Comment, the Reference Paper was created not to focus on
combating the monopolization of the telecommunications industry per se, but
rather “on the anti-competitive practices of major suppliers in a particular market.”37 If a first world country has the ability to control the terms of use of their
product, or their donation, the Reference Paper considers them a “major supplier.”38 To compare to modern U.S. antitrust law, this approach is similar to
the methods of dealing with monopolies and, specifically, group boycotts or
exclusionary practices.39 While it begins to address issues of anticompetitive
practices and informational asymmetries, this Comment asserts that it falls
short in fully providing developing countries with the protection they need.
Antitrust law is an appropriate lens for this evaluation because it is economic in nature, practical, and provides specific incentives that would be helpful in
providing assistance to third world countries.40 At a very basic level, antitrust
law is concerned with fairness.41 The benefits of allowing international telecommunications law to follow the basic rubric of antitrust law are multiple.
However, for clarity this Comment will discuss three in detail: (1) incentive
rationale coupled with risk aversion, (2) the existence of per se violations for
group boycotts and horizontal restraints of trade, and (3) the fact-specific approach used to evaluate monopolistic behavior, specifically within the realm of
natural monopolies.

Telecommunications, supra note 11.
Id.
36 Guermazi, supra note 32.
37 Id. at 2.
38 See id. at 3 (describing “major supplier”).
39 CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION 394 (Robert Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).
40 RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 379 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
8th ed. 2011).
41 GOETZ, supra note 39, at 10-11.
34
35
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The first reason why an antitrust law approach would be well suited to conquer the difficulties associated with an expanding global telecommunications
industry is rooted in incentive theory. Incentive regulation is a recognized and
relatively laissez-faire form of governmental control.42 The threat of natural
monopolies, as well as economic monopolies, is real in the telecommunications industry.43 Natural monopolies demonstrate three main characteristics: (1)
high fixed costs, (2) low marginal cost, and (3) a decreasing marginal cost
curve through the point at which it crosses the average cost curve.44 All three of
these factors are present in the telecommunications industry, and, in fact, any
industry that can be classified as a public carrier.45 First, the fixed costs associated with telecommunications infrastructure are high.46 These fixed costs are
often high enough to be prohibitive.47 Second, demonstrating the low marginal
costs of the industry then becomes almost intuitive: the high fixed costs involve mainly start-up costs, and after the lines have been laid or satellites have
been sent to orbit, the additional cost of adding the marginal user ‘N’ is negligible.48 Third, the cost of adding marginal user ‘N+1’ is less than that of ‘N’
because with more “line”49 that is added, it becomes easier to add further connections.50 Thus, the telecommunication industry shows all of the classic symptoms of a market highly susceptible to natural monopolization. With this susceptibility comes the danger of artificially high prices.51 One way to address
this problem is through Incentive Regulation.52
We should, as a policy matter, encourage both efficient behavior and efficient outcomes. One of the benefits of Incentive Regulation is that it supports
this notion.53 Policies that tend to encourage inefficient entry miss the point of
economic regulation.54 Efficient economies are meritocracies and they should

POSNER, supra note 40, at 374.
See GOETZ, supra note 39, at 378 (stating that a natural monopoly is “a situation
wherein the economic of scale are so strong that a single provider will almost inevitably
come to dominate the ‘market.”).
44 POSNER, supra note 40, at 367-68.
45 Id. at 368-69.
46 Id. at 367.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Here, read “line, Internet connection, satellite connection, etc.”
50 For an example of low marginal costs, imagine adding one additional home to an
existing power grid. The costs of laying an additional few feet of line to a massive structure
are relatively negligible.
51 POSNER, supra note 40, at 369.
52 Id. at 374.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 369.
42
43
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be treated as such.55 A firm should not be punished for having a low cost structure subject to legal limitations imposed by, for example, the Sherman Act56
and Clayton Act.57 Incentive Regulation “permit[s] rate changes based on
changes in an industrywide [sic] cost index.”58 This rubric would allow firms to
benefit from an external increase in cost by subjecting their permitted priceincreases to reflect those external increases in cost.59 To apply this method to
telecommunications, we can assume that a natural resource is used in the construction and repair of all telecommunications lines; silicone in fiber-optic cables, for example. If the price of this raw material were to increase by $1 per
pound in a given time period, then naturally monopolistic firms could increase
their prices to reflect this change without ramifications.60
The Economics of the O-Ring’s Application in International
Telecommunication
Ricardian theory is based on comparative advantage.61 Comparative advantage is a situation in which one supplier can produce something at a lower
cost than another supplier.62 Given a few simplifying assumptions,63 Ricardian
GOETZ, supra note 39.
See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
57 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them. . .
Id.
58 POSNER, supra note 40, at 375.
59 Id.
60 See id. This example is based on Judge Posner’s explanation of Incentive Regulation.
61 STEVE SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND POLICY, V. 1.0, THE RICARDIAN THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE FLAT, Ch. 2 (2016) (ebook).
62 Lauren F. Landsbur, Comparative Advantage, An Economics by Topic detail, THE
LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/Details/comparativeadvantage.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2016).
63 A.C. Mulligan et. al., David Ricardo and Comparative Advantage, IANG BLOG,
http://iang.org/free_banking/david.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). These assumptions include the following the following:
There are no transport costs. Costs are constant and there are no economies of scale. There
are only two economies producing two goods. The theory assumes that traded goods are
homogeneous (i.e., identical). Factors of production are assumed to be perfectly mobile.
55
56
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theory generally states that comparative advantage serves as the fundamental
component and deciding factor behind international trade.64 Ricardo’s theory is
important in international telecommunications because it provides the economic reasoning behind the first world’s decision to under-invest in the third
world.65 The first world has a comparative advantage in both research and development (“R&D”) of new telecommunications technologies, as well as their
addition to existing infrastructure.66 Thus, it is more efficient for them to simply provide the third world with already-developed technologies than to provide
them with the funding to develop it on their own. The processes of learning by
doing and any positive externalities that may occur during R&D phases are
therefore unavailable to the third world.67 The Reference Paper does not (and
arguably cannot) deal with this issue. The positive returns associated with the
research, development, and implementation of telecommunications infrastructure are not fully comprehended by the Reference Paper and lead to a major
disadvantage to the third world.
Having set out the theory and the economics behind Michael Kremer’s thesis, this Comment will now discuss how the theory can specifically be applied
to telecommunications infrastructure.
With the proliferation of mobile devices on both a national and global scale
and the constant development of newer and faster data networks,68 it is easy to
see how a reliable telecommunications infrastructure is crucial for a developing economy.69 The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development applies to telecommunications infrastructures as well as skill-level of labor.70 This portion of
the analysis—proving that this theory applies to telecommunications—is relatively straightforward. The more difficult part is deciding how to utilize that

There are no tariffs or other trade barriers. There is perfect knowledge, so that all buyers and
sellers know where the cheapest goods can be found internationally.
Id.
64 Id.
65 See infra Part III.
66 See infra Part I.
67 See infra Part III.
68 Sébastien Page, AT&T to Launch 4G Network in 2011, IPHONE DOWNLOAD BLOG
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.iphonedownloadblog.com/2010/09/16/att-to-launch-4gnetwork-in-2011/.
69 See generally Lars-Hendrik Röller & Leonard Waverman, Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach, 91 THE AM. ECON. REV.
909 (2001) (discussing the effects of telecommunications on the economy of countries).
70 See generally Kremer, supra note 1 (establishing that something is an o-ring when, if
it fails, it can be catastrophic to a developing economy). Technically, many things can be orings in any given economic situation. I am limiting my analysis to show that currently
telecommunications are an economic staple but the general concept, when broadly defined,
can apply to various inputs.
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knowledge. Thus, Part II, Section I will focus on strictly applying Kremer’s
theory to telecommunication infrastructures in third world countries.71 Section
II will then begin to analyze what can be done with this information. Specifically, this Comment will examine what incentives are present to assist developing countries in realizing the criticality of a reliable and stable telecommunications infrastructure.
Telecommunication and Economic Growth
We all have cell phones. As of 2010, there are five billion cellular connections (essentially, cell phones) worldwide,72 and it is estimated that 70% of the
global population owns a cell phone based on the number of cell phones sold.73
We all use the Internet; from 2005 to 2008, Internet usage in the United States
alone rose roughly ten percent,74 and global Internet usage rose 444.8% from
2000 to 2010.75 Rapid dissemination of information is becoming necessary for
any developing economy. It is insufficient to show, simply, that telecommunications are becoming important. It must be both necessary and positively correlated to economic development before asserting that it is a catalyst for
growth. Röller and Waverman studied the global penetration rate of telecommunication infrastructures and plotted that information in an econometric
model against gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth.76 They found there is a
positive correlation between telecommunication infrastructure and GDP
growth.77 However, a positive correlation is not enough—there must also be
causation.78 To assert causation, they examined the impact that investment in,
See infra Part II.
Over 5 billion mobile phone connections worldwide, BBC.COM (July 9, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10569081. Astonishingly, twenty percent of all new cell phone
connections occurred in the 18 months between January 2009 and July 2010, and it is predicted that another one billion connections will be made before 2012.
73 Cell Phone Statistics-The Growth of Mobile, MOBILECAUSE.COM (Dec. 15, 2010),
https://www.mobilecause.com/cell-phone-statistics.
74 Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access2000-2015.
75 Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated June 30, 2016).
76 Röller, supra note 69 (using a structural model that closely examines telecommunications investment).
77 Id. (conducting several studies to determine the impact of telecommunications infrastructure on economic growth in various forms).
78 The causation does not need to be positive, however; the correlation does. This is a
subtle distinction that will become important later on in the comment. For example, finding
a positive correlation between properly functioning o-rings and successful shuttle launches
would not prove difficult; they are positively correlated. Conversely, when an o-ring fails, a
shuttle launch has a lower chance of success. This relationship only becomes apparent,
71
72
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and proliferation of, telecommunications infrastructure has on a growing economy.79 Their results include investment leading to:
Growth because its products—cable, switches, and so forth—lead to increases in the demand for the goods and services used in their production. In
addition, the economic returns on to telecommunications infrastructure investment are much greater than the returns on just the telecommunications investment itself. Where the state of the telephone system is rudimentary, communications between firms is limited…As the telephone system improves, the costs
of doing business fall, and output will increase for individual firms in individual sectors of the economy. ‘If the telephone does have an impact on a nation’s
economy, it will be through the improvements of the capabilities of managers
to communicate with each other rapidly over increased distances.’ Thus, telecommunications infrastructure investment and derived services provide significant benefits; their presence allows productive units to produce better…it has
been argued that telecommunications investments have important spillovers
and create externalities.80
Both the direct and spillover effects81 of investment in telecommunications
infrastructure are substantial.
To support the thesis of a correlated relationship without direct proof of a
causal relationship, analogies can be used. Restricting the analysis to economic
development leads to a few interesting examples. The first example is labor,
which is positively correlated to economic growth, and without which an
economy cannot survive.82 Similarly, an economy cannot grow in the twentyhowever, when the latter occurs. The o-ring must fail in order to observe their true connection. This is the natural relationship between any necessary but insufficient input, such as a
telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, we will see the correlation but examine the underlying data to trust (for lack of a better word) that a causal relationship exists.
79 Röller, supra note 76.
80 Id. at 909-10 (stating that various studies support the notion that “[i]t is a common
conception that a modern communications system is essential to development.”); Nathanial
H. Leff, Externalities, Information Costs, and Social Benefit-Cost Analysis for Economic
Development: An Example from Telecommunications, 32(2) Economic Development and
Cultural Change 255 (Jan. 1984).
81 Spillover effects are, generally speaking, externalities. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, Economic Analysis of Research Spillovers Implications for the Advanced Technology Program,
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (Dec. 1996), http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr708.htm;
see also Externality defined as “A consequence or side effect of one’s economic activity,
causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer without compensation”. –Also termed
spillover… Externality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
82 This idea presents the intriguing question of how an economy, within the strict definition of the word, can exist with a very limited (single digit) work force. The answer will rely
on fact that, for this example, it is assumed that an economy can exist with zero workers. An
economy cannot exist with zero workers. The impossibility proves the notion that a necessary condition (here, certain limited inputs in economic development) exists even if the
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first century without a reliable telecommunications infrastructure. An economy, by definition,83 has never existed without even a rudimentary telecommunications system and by showing through positive correlations that increased
investments and efficiencies in infrastructure lead to economic development, it
can be positively asserted that we have discovered another O-Ring.
Application of the Telecommunication Theory
Once it is evident that a telecommunications infrastructure is an O-Ring in
economic development, the analysis must necessarily shift from one of discovery to one of application. Essentially, how can we apply this information?
There are several important points to be made in this section. First, the question must be asked of how much government regulation and incentivizing is
necessary for a developing economy to properly grow. Second, a discussion of
private versus public sector involvement in this process is compulsory. The
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) answered these questions by
creating the Reference Paper, to which around 75 countries have already adhered.84
Government Regulation and Incentives
Applying an appropriate amount of government regulation in international
telecommunications is a difficult balance to strike. Just as most parents strive
to strike a balance between draconian methods of regulating a child’s behavior
and a more laissez faire method of allowing self-teaching with the inevitable
mistake, governments of developing economies should strike a balance between over- and under-regulation of their expanding telecommunications infrastructure. On the one hand, with too much regulation comes the possibility of
limited development of new technologies and methods that might be present in
a state of competition.85 On the other hand, a state of complete deregulation in
causation relationship cannot be directly proven due to a lack of direct evidence. An economy has never existed which consisted of zero workers, yet it can be asserted that a workforce, irrelevant of skill level, is positively correlated with economic development.
83 Economy is defined as: the management or administration of the wealth and resources of a community”. Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This implies that a transfer of information, whether, as was the case in historic barter economies,
through verbal exchange in person or, more modernly, through a telecommunications network, is necessary.
84 Guermazi, supra note 32, at 25 n.2.
85 POSNER, supra note 40, at 288-89 (discussing monopoly as a form of regulation involving patents, and how a market with more than one firm in a perfect state of competition
is more likely to try and innovate from a technological standpoint than a market in which
one firm controls the sole means of production).
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the area of building an infrastructure might lead to the problems associated
with natural monopoly present in any infrastructure,86 such as misguided incentives. The pros and cons of government regulation in this area will be discussed, but this Comment asserts that limited regulation, coupled with competition, is the optimal strategy to handle the rigors of maturation associated with
establishing a technological infrastructure. With the continuing globalization of
telecommunications, there is support finding that international regulation is
necessary to combat natural forces that could undermine the third world’s
chances of competing with the developed countries. The United Nations (U.N.)
has investigated this issue and responded by enabling the ITU to combat these
problems.87 The goal of the ITU is “to get everyone to work together – government and industry alike – to come up with solutions that work: for sharing
knowledge, developing tools, and building and safeguarding networks.”88 The
ITU is necessary to ensure an equal playing field for all countries,89 and has
burdened itself with the responsibility of ensuring that developing countries
have sufficient telecommunications infrastructure to stay competitive globally.90 With respect to international aid, communications and transportation infrastructure is the highest subset of aid from the World Bank, above energy,
agriculture, and education.91 Thus, it is clear the World Bank, as well as the
86 Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, Note, The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the
Telecommunications Sector around the World, 47 J.L. & ECON. 395, 400 (Oct. 2004) (stating “Most economists . . . argue that that privatization works best when there is competition
that limits the market power of the incumbent(s). Competition is thus seen as a complement
of privatization.”).
87 See generally About ITU, ITU,
http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/aboutitu.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (stating that the ITU has been in existence for over 145 years and has “coordinated the shared
global use of the radio spectrum, promoted international cooperation in assigning satellite
orbits, worked to improve telecommunications infrastructure in the developing world, established the worldwide standards that foster seamless interconnection of a vast range of communications systems and addressed the global challenges of our times, such as mitigating
climate change and strengthening cybersecurity.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter About
ITU].
88 ITU vision statement, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ClimateChange/Documents/S-GEN-CLIM-2008-11-PDF-E.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
89 See generally Building global communication frameworks for all, ITU,
http://www.itu.int/net/newsroom/CIS/2009/backgrounders/global_communication.aspx (last
visited Oct. 26, 2016) (stating ITU “has also successfully regulated worldwide use of the
radio-frequency spectrum, ensuring all international wireless communications remain interference-free to ensure the relay of vital information and economic data to all parts of the
globe.”).
90 See About ITU, supra note 87.
91 See generally Financing for sustainable development, OECD.ORG,
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34447_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2016).
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ITU, view communications as a necessary element in development. Alternatively, a course of action that could also be deemed favorable to the expansion
of a reliable telecommunications infrastructure is full privatization in both the
developmental and implementation stages.

Privatization92
Privatizing entire industries has been both beneficial and devastating to
economies.93 As with most evaluations, there are valid points to be made on
both sides of the debate. With privatization and deregulation come increased
incentives to research and develop more efficient methods of production and
distribution.94 In his book, Judge Posner explains the various attributes of deregulation (as most economists do), while recognizing the need for government
regulation and ownership in certain areas.95 Coincidentally, one of the examples that Judge Posner provides is on point:
What is the demand for deregulation? A clue is the competing
away of regulation-induced profits in the airline industry. A
more general cause is technological change, which in recent decades has favored competition; think of the effect of the cell
phone, fiber optic cables, and the Internet on telephone service.96

The ITU acknowledges the trends of privatization and competition, as well
as the need for minimal levels of government ownership and regulation.97
92 Privatization, used herein, means strict privatization, as the word is defined in Black’s
Law Dictionary (“The act or process of converting a business or industry from governmental ownership or control to private enterprise.”) Privatization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1390 (10th ed. 2014), and in close relation, also used is the term, deregulation.
93 For example, the global market collapse in 2008 was due, in part, to the underregulation of the financial services industry which led to the “simultaneous mortgage default
of thousands of homeowners.” Yusuf Yusuf, Moment of Clarity: A Centrist Approach to
Mortgage Lending, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 267, 269 (2013).
94 POSNER, supra note 40, at 385 (examining both the fall in real prices for tickets and increased airline traffic that resulted from deregulation of the airline industry in the 1970s).
95 See generally POSNER, supra note 40, at 385-86 (comparing industries such as “electric power generation” in which the government clearly does not possess a comparative
advantage in terms of production to industries where the government may be able to provide
better service such as “jails and prisons”).
96 Id. at 385.
97 See Joel Stratte-McClure, Privatization and Liberalization Set Off Big Bang, ITU
(Oct. 13, 1999), https://www.itu.int/newsarchive/wtd/1999/iht10/tem-02.html (discussing
worldwide trends of privatization and competition among companies in the world telecommunications sector); Gustavo Peña Quiñones,
ITU/NBTC, Seminar on Telecommunications Regulatory Best Practices: Toward the Digital
Economy Thailand, 40 (2015), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-
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The best approach in dealing with international telecommunications development is to have privatization of the industry with substantial (but not burdensome) governmental regulation.98 The trend, however, is toward privatization.99 For example, between 1980 and 1998 the percentage of countries with
private telecommunications operators increased from 2% to 42%.100 Industries
that require substantial and often prohibitive fixed costs show this kind of privatization growth very rarely.101 In a study involving 177 countries, Wei Li and
Lixin Colin Wu econometrically examined the actual impact that privatization
and competition has on the telecommunications sector around the world.102 In
general, they found a positive correlation between privatization and economic
growth.103 Their assertion, however, goes further to suggest that “full privatization, which gave private owners control rights, were much more effective in
improving performance than partial privatization, which left control rights in
the hands of bureaucrats.”104 Their study only examines internal regulation; that
is, regulation within each developing country.105 They fail to account for the
possible effects that a global regulatory body, such as the ITU, might have on
telecommunication development. Most of the reasons they give for the competitive advantage of privatization over publicly owned enterprise,106 however,
would hold true even under a global framework. For example, they cite the
lack of incentive to monitor individuals for performance, as well as a general
lack of incentive to reduce costs, as reasons why privatization shows increased
returns.107 We have seen, however, that incentives can be provided to government enterprises as well as corporations to lower costs and increase efficiency.108 These incentives usually come in the form of tax breaks for utilizing
Presence/AsiaPacific/Documents/Events/2015/March-DigitalEconomy/Session12_Gustova_Pe%C3%B1a-Qui%C3%B1ones.pdf (stating “the concept of minimal regulation
should be prioritized when it comes to government regulation of Information, Communication, and Technology, worldwide).
98 This notion underlies the Reference Paper, but the paper has fallen short of providing
the developing world adequate protection from predatory practices of first world countries.
99 Li, supra note 86, at 396.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 396-400.
102 Id. at 397.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 401-02.
106 For example, Ricardian principles. See generally Lauren F. Landsbur, Comparative
Advantage, an Economics by Topic detail, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIB.,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/Details/comparativeadvantage.html (last visited Nov.
1, 20156); SURANOVIC, supra note 61, at Ch. 2.2.
107 Li, supra note 86, at 399-400.
108 See James Salzer, Lawmakers hand out tax breaks to some businesses, ATLANTA J.
CONST. (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/lawmakers-
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green energy, subsidies, and so forth.109 The incentives generally are from
governments to private companies. Within the realm of the telecommunications industry, the incentive chain can run from international governing bodies
through local governments to private firms.
Governmental incentives are what is lacking from the Reference Paper, and
what is lacking in international telecommunications law, to ensure that the developing world can economically compete with the developed world.110 Absent
from any regulation, there would be sufficient incentives for the first world to
invest in the developing world’s telecommunications network, however the
amount of investment ensures that the third world remain below the first world
in the ability to compete on an international level.
PART II: COUNTER ARGUMENTS – LEAP-FROGGING AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAMS
Part II of this Comment will discuss the various counter arguments to the ORing’s application to telecommunications development. Specifically, the ideas
of leap-frogging and technological transfer programs are formidable opponents
for an O-Ring analysis within the framework of international telecommunications development.
Leap-Frogging
As an alternative to requiring developing economies to repeat every step of
the growing process, the concept of leap-frogging would allow these economies to learn from their developed counterparts and avoid some growing
pains.111 Leap-frogging would allow third world countries to “take-off” from a
state of early development to competing on a global level.112 This concept is a
counter argument to the O-Ring theory, because this Comment asserts that developing economies will never be able to catch up to advanced economies due
to increasing returns on investment to telecommunications infrastructure,
whereas the leap-frogging theory asserts that “developing countries can jump
some steps and avoid having to go through stages experienced by the present
hand-out-tax-breaks-to-some-businesses/nQsbW/ (explaining how some businesses were
offered tax breaks for building tourist attractions, entertainment centers, golf courses, etc.).
109 Id.; see also Jim Abrams & Associated Press, Renewable energy firms clamor for tax
breaks, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=5696908&page=1 (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (stating how individuals were also targeted for special tax breaks).
110 See infra Part III.
111 A.S. Bhalla, Note, Can ‘High’ Technology Help Third World ‘Take-Off’?, 22 ECON.
& POL. WKLY. 1082, 1082 (1987).
112 Id.
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advanced countries.”113 Proponents of theoretical leap-frogging agree that increasing returns exist absent their theory.114 They assert that “[u]nless the third
world countries introduce high technology in their export-oriented industries
… they are unlikely to retain or capture export markets.”115 Third world countries can utilize the concept of leap frogging to counteract this partially outcome-determinative disadvantage.
According to the theory, it is somewhat intuitive that leap-frogging is made
easier when third world countries invest less in infrastructure because they can
then jump from one stage to a more advanced one more easily.116 In practice,
however, it actually is beneficial in the long term for third world countries to
invest more in domestic infrastructure because they will have better systems in
place and can leap-frog further than they would otherwise.117
Leap-frogging presents an interesting conundrum. This counterargument assumes away a foundational element of this Comment. According to A.S. Bhalla, “it assumes that the indigenous technology capability is at a stage where
high technology can be assimilated and efficiently utilised [sic], and some
components of it can be domestically produced.”118 This seemingly minor assumption brushes away this Comment’s major premise. The argument that
high technology can be easily assimilated into third world countries assumes
that there is already sufficient technology in place upon which high technology
can be built. Therefore, it naturally follows that those countries that already
have a semi- to fully-reliable telecommunications infrastructure can more easily leap-frog whereas those countries in the early stages of development will
suffer from smaller jumps. In certain conditions, this situation demonstrates
increasing returns to investment on infrastructure, which will further the ORing problem. Thus, although leap-frogging serves as an interesting counter
argument to this Comment’s thesis, this fatal assumption ultimately serves as
an Achilles’ heel.

Id.
Id. at 1083.
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., id. (“A dilemma faced by the third world policy-makers is to strike a good
balance between domestic technological development and imports of technology from
abroad.”). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it might be efficient for policy makers to
invest less in domestic infrastructure and instead focus on importing technology in an attempt to use that technology to leap-frog.
117 See Bettina Gransow, Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America-an Assessment of Strategies, Actors and Risks, 20 J. OF CHINESE POL. SCI. 267, 268 (2015) (for
example, China investing in its infrastructure resulted in high economic growth).
118 Bhalla, supra note 111, at 1083.
113
114
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Technology Transfer Programs
The idea behind technology transfer programs is the natural incentive that
first world countries have to invest in third world countries.119 The developed
country has an incentive to donate technology to under-developed countries so
that its own network functions more efficiently and on a broader level. Countries do this for many reasons, but mainly because it is advantageous to them in
the long term to have compatible and reliable grids globally, across many technological disciplines.120 It becomes easier to market a cell phone, for example,
if the purchaser/user is assured that their phone will work on cellular grids all
over the world.121 The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) investment in
flight systems of various countries is another example of tech transfer.122 Although most of this Comment is dedicated to cellular and Internet infrastructures, satellite grids and updates are just as much a part of the global telecommunications network. The FAA is “moderniz[ing] the national airspace from a
ground radar system to satellite-based GPS technology.”123 This new technology and method will be known as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).124 NextGen will allow pilots to communicate via a superior
satellite-based grid system, as opposed to the current cellular system.125 To realize all the benefits that the system is designed to provide, the system must
have global support.126 The benefits of sharing this new technology include
easier flight paths when flying internationally, the need for only one flight system on each plane, and simpler training for pilots on the new software.127 This
donation is considered a technology transfer because the NextGen software
was developed and largely utilized in the United States, yet it will be implemented in many countries all over the world.128 This sort of technology transfer
119 See id. at 1085 (explaining how often, First World occupants often want to share new
technologies with poorer countries that otherwise would not be able to afford them).
120 Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Hearing on Reauthorization and Reform of
the Federal Aviation Administration and the Airport Improvement Program Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure H.R., 112th Cong. 30 (2011)
[hereinafter Century of Aviation] (statement of Hon. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator of the
FAA).
121 One sees the emergence of certain apps aimed at tracking the experience with particular wireless carriers to give the consumer more power when choosing cell phone plans. See,
e.g., About Us, SENSORLY, http://www.sensorly.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (an
example of an app that enables its users to track their wireless connectivity).
122 Century of Aviation, supra note 120.
123 NextGen Works, FAA.GOV, https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/works/#content (last visited
Sept. 12, 2016).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Century of Aviation, supra note 120.
127 Id. at 34.
128 Id. at 74.
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arguably can assist third world countries in their attempts to catch up to the
developed world within the realm of telecommunications.129
This assertion presents a counter argument to this Comment because it postulates that first world countries have an incentive to assist third world countries in gaining ground in the developmental race.130 An interesting economic
note to this theory is the fact that natural market forces are at work; no international enforcement is necessary to ensure that technology is transferred and
thus standard Ricardian theory can explain these transfers.131 The comparative
advantage, encouraging countries to produce goods at a lower cost, comparative to the same good made in another country,132 weighs in favor of the developed country. The reason developed countries have the comparative advantage
is because technology already exists upon which to build further improvements.
That argument, however, has flaws. Technology transfer programs are beneficial to third world countries; this is undeniable.133 Undoubtedly, third world
countries are placed in a better position due to the charity of the first world
countries. People will be more likely to travel to countries if they know their
cell phone will operate properly;134 airlines are incentivized to reduce prices on
flights to destinations where NextGen will be installed;135 tourism will increase
in countries that have Internet access.136 The flaw comes from a process called
learning-by-doing,137 which enables those conducting purposeful research not
only to gain from their directed goal, but also to discover new ideas or process-

Bhalla, supra note 111, at 1082-83.
See generally id. at 1084 (describing the persuasiveness of policy considerations
when making decisions that influence the pace and direction of technological change in
small and large countries).
131 See generally Murray N. Rothbard, The Ricardian Law of Comparative Advantage,
MISES DAILY ARTICLES (Apr. 26, 2012), https://mises.org/library/ricardian-lawcomparative-advantage (defining the Ricardian Model as a model of international trade
introduced by David Ricardo and explaining comparative advantage). In this case, the comparative advantage of the developed national would be the ability to perform superior research and development. However, herein lies the flaw to this possible rebuttal argument of
tech transfer; the developed country is ‘learning-by-doing,’ whereas the developing country
just utilizes the new technology and gains from no positive externalities.
132 Id.
133 See generally Bhalla, supra note 111.
134 Röller, supra note 69, at 910 n.3.
135 Century of Avaiation, supra note 120, at 71 (statement of Olas E. Calio, President &
CEO of Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.).
136 Craig Standing, et al., The Impact of the Internet in Travel and Tourism: A Research
Review 2001-2010, 31 J. of TRAVEL & TOURIST MKT., 82, 82-83 (Jan. 23, 2014).
137 Dr. Henning Troll & Dr. Thomas Stahlecker, Fraunhofer ISI, Europe’s Regional Research Systems: Current Trends and Structures, EUR. RES. AREA 7, 8 (2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/kf2008.pdf.
129
130
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es along the way. Troll and Stahlecker state, “examples from basic research
demonstrate that not all knowledge derived from research is an immediately
relevant input to innovation processes. It does, however, add to the knowledge
base and may become relevant in the long term.”138 A great example of the
learning-by-doing process is the Internet itself.139
The Internet was an ‘invention’ of the military, but began to be applied in
ways not originally intended.140 Researchers in the United States learned that
by working with military communication, something much greater could develop.141 Thus, if the United States were to share the military communications
with another country so that it connected the armed forces around the globe,
then that would be considered technology transfer. The domestic developments
in Internet connectivity, as a result of targeted research, occurred by ‘doing.’
Herein lies the shortcoming of the technology transfer argument. Although the
developing country benefits by being provided with superior technology, the
developed country: (1) already has the technology that was given, and (2) can
learn from their original developments, a possibility absent from third world
nations. Thus, although technology transfer programs can be helpful to developing countries in the short term, it will not assist them in the long term and
may ultimately exacerbate their inability to catch up in global telecommunications development.
Another example of how technology transfers are ineffective for purposeful
GDP growth is seen in recent ITU statistics regarding their relationship.142 According to the ITU, the least technologically developed country in the world is
Myanmar.143 Focusing specifically on cellular penetration in Myanmar, the
country is only twenty-four years behind the most developed country in terms
of telecommunication development, Sweden.144 This could, in part, be due to
Id.
See generally Vinton Cerf, How the Internet Came to Be, NETVALLEY (1993),
http://www.netvalley.com/archives/mirrors/cerf-how-inet.html (describing how experimenting with voice compression led to the separation of Transmission Control Protocol from
Internet Protocol and later, User Datagram Protocol).
140 See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet 2-3 INTERNET SOC’Y,
http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2016) (describing how independent researchers developed the concept of the
internet and then reached out to the military for funding to implement their ideas).
141 Id. at 7 (describing how government suggestions of incorporating Internet protocols
into supported operating systems led to widespread use of the Internet as we know it today).
142 ITU, The World in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures: A Decade of ICT Growth Driven by
Mobile Technologies 4 http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/material/Telecom09_flyer.pdf [hereinafter The World in 2009] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) (using this chart to explain how despite the prevalence of technology transitions such as mobile device users in developing
countries, this transition has little effect the overall GDP of the country).
143 Id.
144 Id.
138
139
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the fact that Sweden and other developed countries invested in a global telecommunications network, which would help Myanmar.145 In terms of economic
development, however, Myanmar remains over 160 years behind in terms of
GDP per capita.146 This demonstrates the importance of assisting countries in
their telecommunication programs. It also shows, however, the importance of a
sophisticated network and the levels of return that can be gained by relatively
slight advantages in telecommunications infrastructure (and, thus, an inability
to catch up).
Both counter arguments presented in this Comment are commendable as individual theories, but are both lacking in their ability to properly deal with developmental issues presented with international telecommunications infrastructure.147 Taken to their logical extremes, they can even be seen to worsen the
problem.148 That problem, this Comment asserts, is that normal market forces
and standard Ricardian incentives create a situation in which third world countries will be unable to catch up to first world countries in their economic development. Leap-frogging and technology transfer programs both arguably
place the developing country in a better position than they would be otherwise;
however, this Comment deals in relative terms, not absolute terms.149 The issue
of “catching up,” as defined in this Comment, is necessarily relative in nature;
every country in the world might be “improving” or “developing,” but it is
their position relative to the whole that matters. In this sense, both the leapfrogging and technology transfer theories fail to properly deal with the issue of
relative growth of the already-developed countries when compared to their
lesser-developed counterparts. Thus, the need for a regulatory body such as the
ITU to combat the natural market forces is clear, and becomes further clarified
by a case study of Cameroon.
PART III – CASE EXAMPLE: CAMEROON
Cameroon serves as a good case study for this Comment for several reasons.
First, it demonstrates the characteristics of a third world country.150 The GDP
145 Lars Hulkrantz, Telecommunications Liberalization in Sweden: Is “Intermediate”
Regulation Viable?, 9 SWED. ECON. POL’Y REV. 133, 157-58 (2002).
146 The World in 2009, supra note 142, at 4.
147 See infra Part II.
148 See infra Part II.
149 Absolute and Relative, ENCYC. OF MARXISM,
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/a/b.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
150 The Third World is defined as a developing country, or
[t]he group of nations (esp. in Africa and Asia) not aligned with major powers, whether
Western democracies (i.e., the First — or Free — World) or countries that were formerly
part of the Soviet bloc (i.e., the Second World). Although Third World nations are often
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of Cameroon ranked 97th in the world, at $72.74 billion in 2015.151 By comparison, the United States ranked third in the world (behind China and the European Union152) at $18.040 trillion.153 Second, telecommunications investment in
Cameroon is lacking.154 Only about seventeen percent of the international aid
directed toward Cameroon is focused on the category of “economic infrastructure and services.”155 Thus, there is enough of an incentive from the U.N. and
from other nations to invest in Cameroon’s telecommunications infrastructure,
but insufficient incentive to allow full development. Third, Cameroon fits the
Comment well because it has demonstrated positive GDP growth over the last
decade, but not enough to be able to compete internationally.156 Said another
way, it is moving forward, but still falling behind. The average annual GDP
growth for all African countries for the past decade is 5.2%.157 This annual percentage has steadily increased, at worst, remaining constant, over that time
period.158 Cameroon, on the other hand, has had a maximum annual GDP

underdeveloped, the term Third World may denote only their political rather than their economic status.
Third World, BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Developing Country is then
defined as
[a] country that is not as economically or politically advanced as the main industrial powers.
Developing countries are located mostly in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East,
and Latin and South America. — Also termed developing state; underdeveloped country;
less-developed country; Third World country. “Pertinent terminology has undergone extensive changes in the past 40 years. At the very start, before the category found its way into
official texts, economic and political writings referred mainly to ‘poor’ or ‘backward’ countries. In the late 1940s, the term ‘underdeveloped countries’ came into common usage in
economic literature and in the jargon of international organizations. It was replaced in the
1950s by the term ‘less developed countries,’ for which the current ‘developing countries’
was eventually substituted. These terms are essentially interchangeable as they refer to the
same group and kind of countries. However, variations in the use of the term reflect significant changes in the perception of the central issue, namely, economic development, as well
as responses to justified sensitivities on the part of the countries principally concerned.
Developing Country, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
151 The World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity),
CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#cm (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 OLIVIER NANA NZÈPA & ROBERTINE TANKEU KEUTCHANKEU, 2007 CAMEROON TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW, A SUPPLY SIDE ANALYSIS OF POLICY
OUTCOMES 29 (2008) (ebook).
155 Aid at a Glance Charts, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
https://public.tableau.com/profile/thielemans.v#!/vizhome/shared/HCGM5YYF5 (last updated Jan. 27, 2016).
156 UNECA, AFRICAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 2010 118-20 (2010) (ebook).
157 Press Release, World Bank, Africa’s Growth Set to Reach 5.2 percent in 2014 With
Strong Investment Growth and Household Spending (Apr. 7, 2014) (on file with author).
158 Id.
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growth rate of 4.5%, and has demonstrated negative trends since that year.159
Lastly, Cameroon has been a member of the ITU for 50 years.160 These four
factors, (1) the proper labeling as a third world country, (2) insufficient amount
of telecommunications infrastructure investment, (3) a relatively low GDP
growth rate, and (4) membership in the ITU, enable an assertion concerning
the proper application of this Comment’s thesis to Cameroon.
This Comment asserts that insufficient investment in telecommunications
infrastructure in third world countries, by first world countries and international organizations alike, is contributing to an increasing and likelyinsurmountable gap in economic growth. Cameroon, and countries like it,
demonstrates the four factors necessary to fit squarely into this hypothesis.
To place this Comment’s argument on more solid footing, Cameroon is
fighting an uphill battle to stay competitive in the global economic battle due
to its lack of internal and external investment in telecommunications.161 The
ITU, by its own admission, does not provide sufficient support for telecommunications development in countries like Cameroon.162 The main issue with
countries such as Cameroon—and all third world countries for that matter—is
that agencies such as the ITU evaluate their situation with an eye toward internal control and regulatory schemes, while acknowledging (yet brushing aside)
the importance of international cooperation.163 This contradiction is where all
of the problems, and this Comment itself, lie. Multinational organizations cannot simultaneously recognize the proliferation of the global telecommunica159 In other words, the GDP growth rate of Cameroon demonstrates a negative second
derivative. See UNECA, supra note 156 (depicting the downward trend of GDP growth in
Cameroon in a chart with other African countries also represented).
160 See generally List of Member States, ITU, http://www.itu.int/cgibin/htsh/mm/scripts/mm.list?_search=ITUstates&_languageid=1 (last visited Oct. 22, 2016)
(depicting member states of ITU and their dates of entry).
161 To be fair, Cameroon has shown a higher annual GDP growth rate in telecommunications than any other sector in its economy. See UNECA, supra note 156, at 119. Their internal GDP of 500 million CFA Franc (about $1.1 million USD) per year from transportation
and communications is significant in their own economy, however their entire internal investment on both the transportation and communication sectors is less than some private
individual salaries in the United States. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley CEO gets pay worth $15.2
million, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Apr. 17, 2011),
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/ap/ApBusiness/201104170886.
162 ITU, AFRICA REGIONAL PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE WORD TELECOMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE (WTDC-02) YAOUNDÉ (CAMEROON) 6 (2001),
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/afr/WTDC02/PDFs/04e.pdf (stating that “[a]t the international
level, ITU has not been closely involved in telecommunication sector reform. In the past
eight years, it has provided some technical assistance but otherwise almost no support for
telecommunication development projects in Cameroon, possibly because the Area Office in
Yaoundé is not functioning.”).
163 Id. (arguing that, although the world is “shrinking,” Cameroon is simply “slow” to
adapt to the changing environment).
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tions environment, while simultaneously shirking responsibility for keeping the
third world ‘up-to-date.’ The need for developing countries to engage in selfhelp cannot be overstated; however, their internal assistance can only go so far.
When the global telecommunications industry is structured in such an antitrustinducing manor, the need for a policy that encourages competitive behavior is
crucial. Cameroon and all developing countries are feeling the reverberations
of the ineffectiveness of the ITU.
International organizations such as the ITU must treat this problem as if it
were more heavily an antitrust issue and properly incentivize other international organizations and developed countries to invest in developing economies.
Group boycotts, exclusionary practices, monopolization, and tying arrangements are illegal under antitrust law, and should be more clearly condemned in
the international telecommunications arena as well. Even though there has
been relatively large internal investment by Cameroon in its domestic telecommunications infrastructure, international incentive for aid is lacking. The
U.N., in combination with the ITU, must act to combat this problem.
CONCLUSION
This Comment asserts that increasing returns to scale for telecommunications investment will lead to global economic dominance of first world countries. Standard Ricardian thinking will lead to under-investment on the part of
global organizations and first world countries. Therefore, although the Reference Paper serves as a useful starting point for a theory of international equality, the problem needs to be dealt with as if it were an antitrust issue to incentivize the proper amount of investment. Organizations such as the ITU place too
much emphasis on self-help and not enough on properly incentivizing the developed world to assist in allowing the third world to catch up. If incentives for
the first world to invest in developing telecommunications infrastructures remain at their current levels, then developing economies will remain helpless,
regardless of their own desire to compete.
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APPENDIX A
Michael Kremer’s production function to solve for expected production as a product of labor and labor skill is as follows:164

-“E(y)” because it is expected production, not actual production
-“B” is output per worker
-“n” is the number of workers
-“K” is capital
-“q” is the skill of each worker
TAKING REVENUE MINUS COSTS GIVES:

-

164

“w(q)” is the wage rate
“r” is the rental rate of capital

Kremer, supra note 1, at 553-56.
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THE FIRST ORDER CONDITION YIELDS:

-

The derivative of the marginal product of skill for the i-th worker with
respect to the skill of the other workers is positive:

-

Firms will bid the most for higher skilled workers. “Thus, in equilibrium, workers of the same skill are matched together in firms…”165
And, given that all workers pair up with those of similar ability, qi = qi
for all j, we can re-write the F.O.C. as:

-

165

-

F.O.C. on capital implies that:

-

We find supply of k=k* by adding up the k demanded by firms for all
the workers with skills from 0-1:

Id. at 554.
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-

Rearranging, we find that the rental rate of capital in equilibrium is:

-

Rearranging, we find that the rental rate of capital in equilibrium is:

-

With

-

Integrating like before, we find the wage schedule:

-

Here, “C” represents the wage of a worker who has skill=0.
Multiplying by n gives:

αY is payment to capital, (1- α)Y is wage expense, thus
profit = revenue – costs =
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Y – αY – (1- α)Y = 0
Thus, “. . . firms are indifferent as to the skill level of their workers as long as
their labor force is of homogenous skill.”166
Since equilibrium profit is zero, more capital is demanded for betterskilled workers. Countries with better-skilled workers can be more efficient
and use more capital, creating more output and increasing productivity even
more. These kinds of increasing returns are what create incentives to thirdworld countries to engage in telecommunication infrastructure early-on in their
development; they may never be able to catch up.
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Id. at 556.

